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BLD-280        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-2961 
 ___________ 
 
KORAN CAIN, 
                             Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT;  
P/O LECIA, #9875;  
P/O YOUNG, #7442 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 11-cv-04490) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Joel H. Slomsky 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to  
 Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
September 8, 2011 
 
 Before:   SLOVITER, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges  
 
 (Opinion filed October 12, 2011 ) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 On July 15, 2011, Koran Cain filed a pro se civil rights complaint in the District 
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Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania naming the City of Philadelphia Police 
Department and two of its officers, Lecia and Young, as defendants.  According to the 
complaint, Cain seeks relief for an alleged unlawful arrest that occurred twenty years ago, 
on August 16, 1991.  Cain alleges that he was arrested and charged with possession of 
two grams of cocaine, but that Officer Lecia planted the drugs, Officer Young falsified 
public records, and both officers lied under oath.   
 The District Court granted Cain leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed 
the complaint sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), holding that any constitutional 
claims arising out of Cain’s 1991 arrest are now time-barred under the two-year statute of 
limitations for actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Cain timely filed this appeal. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review.  See 
Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  “The statute of limitations for a § 
1983 claim arising in Pennsylvania is two years.”  Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  A cause of action under § 1983 “accrues when the plaintiff knew or should 
have known of the injury upon which [his] action is based.”  Sameric Corp. of Del. v. 
Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998).  Cain’s complaint makes it clear that any cause 
of action arising out of his 1991 arrest accrued more than two years prior to his filing of 
this suit in 2011. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 391-92 (2007) (holding that “the 
statute of limitations on petitioner’s § 1983 claim commenced to run when he appeared 
before the examining magistrate and was bound over for trial.  Since more than two years 
elapsed between that date and the filing of this suit … the action was time barred.”).   
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 Where a statute of limitations defense is apparent on the face of the complaint, a 
district court may dismiss the suit sua sponte under § 1915(e).  See, e.g., Fogle v. Pierson, 
435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006).  The District Court properly followed that course 
here.  Because Cain’s appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm 
the District Court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4.  
